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IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 
 MSLF is a nonprofit, public-interest legal foundation organized under the laws of the 
State of Colorado.  MSLF’s members include individuals who live and work in every State of the 
Nation.  MSLF is dedicated to bringing before the courts those issues vital to the defense and 
preservation of individual liberty, the right to own and use property, limited and ethical 
government, and the free enterprise system.  MSLF believes that the federal government is one 
of limited, enumerated powers to be exercised consistently with the U.S. Constitution.  These 
limited powers include Congress’s commerce power, as conferred by the Commerce Clause.  
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  MSLF believes that Congress commonly exceeds its commerce 
power to justify vastly increasing the scope of congressional legislation beyond what is 
constitutionally permissible.  The result of such overreaching is a federal government that is no 
longer limited and ethical, and further erosion of individual liberty, the right to own and use 
property, and the free enterprise system.  MSLF has often been involved in litigation concerning 
Commerce Clause issues, including, most recently, filing amicus curiae briefs in San Luis & 
Delta-Mendota Water Authority v. Salazar, No. 10-15192 (9th Cir.), Rapanos v. United 
States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006), GDF Realty Investments, LTD v. Norton, 362 F.3d 286 (D.C. Cir. 
2004), and Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003).  MSLF submits that, 
in passing the Health Care Act, Congress has, once again, but this time in an extraordinarily bold 
and unprecedented manner, exceeded its powers under the Commerce Clause. 
ARGUMENT 
 On March 23, 2010, a new health care regime entitled “Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act,” Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (“Health Care Act”), was signed into law.  
Sections 1501 and 1502 of the Health Care Act include an “Individual Mandate” that requires all 
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non-exempt Americans to maintain what Congress deems to be an acceptable level of health 
insurance coverage.   
 The Individual Mandate was passed purportedly pursuant to Congress’s enumerated 
power under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, which 
provides that “The Congress shall have Power . . . to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, 
and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes[.]”  Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. 
Sebelius, 702 F.Supp.2d 598, 609 (E.D. Va. 2010) (“The congressional enactment under review . 
. . literally forges new ground and extends Commerce Clause powers beyond its current high 
watermark.”)  Therefore, Congress tried to demonstrate its belief that the Individual Mandate 
affects interstate commerce: 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The individual responsibility requirement 
provided for in this section . . . is commercial and economic in nature, and 
substantially affects interstate commerce, as a result of the effects described in 
paragraph (2). 
(2) EFFECTS ON THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND 
INTERSTATE COMMERCE.—The effects described in this paragraph are the 
following: 
(A) The requirement regulates activity that is 
commercial and economic in nature: economic and financial 
decisions about how and when health care is paid for, and when 
health insurance is purchased.  In the absence of the requirement, 
some individuals would make an economic and financial decision 
to forego health insurance coverage and attempt to self-insure, 
which increases financial risks to households and medical 
providers. . . .  
See Health Care Act, § 1501.  By purporting to derive its power to enact the Individual Mandate 
from the Commerce Clause, Congress engaged in an unprecedented power grab, wholly at odds 
with the constitutional principle of a limited federal government of enumerated powers. 
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I. THE PRINCIPLE OF A LIMITED FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF 
ENUMERATED POWERS IS DEEPLY ROOTED IN THE HISTORY OF 
THE UNITED STATES. 
A. The Principle Of A Limited Government Of Enumerated Powers 
Can Be Traced Back To The Pre-Revolutionary Period. 
In the 18th century, British power was concentrated entirely in the “King-in-Parliament” 
(i.e., the King, Lords, and Commons).  Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 
96 Yale L.R. 1425, 1431 (1987).  Britons understood this power as being absolute.  Id.; see also 
William Blackstone, Of the Nature of Laws in General, in Commentaries on the Laws of 
England § 2 (1765-69) (In all governments, there is “a supreme, irresistible, absolute, 
uncontrolled authority, in which the jura summi imperii or the rights of sovereignty, reside.”) 
available at http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/blackstone/bla-002.htm.  Many American colonists, 
however, due in part to their struggles with the British Parliament, had developed a profoundly 
different view of government—one in which all power was derived from the people themselves.  
Kurt T. Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail: The Eleventh Amendment and the Background 
Principle of Strict Construction, 50 Wm. & Mary L.R. 1577, 1593 (2009).  
Moreover, the colonial governments themselves reinforced the colonists’ understanding 
that a government derives its power from the people.  Typically, each colony was governed by a 
corporate charter.  Amar, supra, at 1432–33.  These charters, such as the Massachusetts Bay 
Company Charter, established a governor and other governmental agents, much like corporate 
agents.  Id. at 1433.  It was, therefore, understood that, like corporate agents, the colonial 
governmental officials possessed only specific, enumerated powers; purported government 
actions beyond the scope of the charter had no legal authority.  Id. at 1433-35 (citing 
A. McLaughlin, The Foundations of American Constitutionalism 38-65, 104-28 (1961)).  Thus, 
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many colonists believed that, unlike in Britain, parliamentary acts that conflicted with principles 
in the Magna Carta (“Great Charter”) were null and void.  Amar, supra, at 1432-34. 
As a result, many colonists objected not only to Parliament’s actual policies, but also to 
the principle that the power of Parliament was unlimited.  Amar, supra, at 1430.  The Boston Tea 
Party, for example, was a protest against both a tax on tea and the notion that Parliament had the 
power to tax tea.  Amar, supra, at 1430 n.21 (citing J. Blum, E. Morgan, W. Rose, 
A. Schlesinger, K. Stampp, and C. Woodward, The National Experience 94 (1973)).  Indeed, the 
Tea Party took place after Parliament had reduced a tax on tea in an attempt to acclimate 
colonists to the principle of plenary parliamentary taxation powers.  Id.  Thus, the predominant 
colonial view was that Parliament’s power was not absolute but, instead, was limited.  Id. 
B. The Principle Of A Limited Government Of Enumerated Powers 
Is Evident In The Declaration of Independence.   
In 1776, the Founders used the principle of a limited government of enumerated powers 
as their primary justification for independence from England.  The Declaration of Independence 
famously provides that individuals are “endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable 
Rights.”  Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).  In other words, rights are not derived 
from Parliament or any other governmental body, but, instead, exist by virtue of an individual’s 
existence.  The Declaration, therefore:  
[S]peaks simply to the question of whether rights come from government by 
posing, in effect, the question of where government would get its rights if not 
from the people—it being clear that people create and hence come before 
government.  In both logic and time, then, people come first, government second.  
That was the central point the Founders sought to pin down. 
Roger Pilon, The Purpose and Limits of Government, Cato’s Letter #13 6 (1999).  The 
unalienable rights possessed by the people—generally, the right to be free and independent—
were far too numerous to be listed specifically, though the Founders sought generally to capture 
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the essence of these rights by providing that “among these [rights] are Life, Liberty and the 
pursuit of Happiness.”  Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).   
In addition to the unalienable rights, John Locke1 explained that each individual 
possesses an “Executive Power,” i.e., the right to secure an individual’s unalienable rights.  
Pilon, supra, at 15 (citing John Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government § 13 (1690)).  
Accordingly, the Declaration of Independence provides a mechanism for securing the 
unalienable rights of the people.  The Declaration explains that governments are “instituted” 
for the limited purpose of “secur[ing] these rights” of the people, and the authority of the 
government to secure these rights is “derive[ed] . . . from the consent of the governed.”  
Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).   
Consequently, the government’s power exists solely because the people have conferred 
upon the government their right to secure their inalienable rights.  Naturally, then, for the 
government to have the power to secure a purported right, individuals must first have possessed 
that power, and then, through the consent of the governed, must have delegated that power to the 
government.  This provides the foundational premise behind the principle of enumerated 
powers.2   
                                                 
1 As has been documented frequently, John Locke was the primary philosophical influence for 
Thomas Jefferson, the principal author of the Declaration of Independence.  See, e.g., American 
Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky v. McCreary County, Kentucky, 354 F.3d 438, 453 n.7 
(6th Cir. 2003) (citing Carl Becker, The Declaration of Independence:  A Study in the History of 
Ideas 79 (1922) (noting that with respect to “the political philosophy of Nature and natural 
rights” referenced in the Declaration that the “lineage is direct:  Jefferson copied Locke”)), 
aff’d, 545 U.S. 844 (2005). 
2 In the specific context of this case, for the government to secure a purported “right” to 
affordable health care, individuals must first have possessed the right to force other individuals 
to acquire health insurance or pay a penalty.  Because individuals have never possessed such a 
right, they could not possibly have delegated that right to the government. 
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C. The Principle Of A Limited Government Of Enumerated Powers 
Is Explicitly Included In The Articles Of Confederation. 
 In the years following the Declaration of Independence, the principle of a limited 
government of enumerated powers was not abandoned.  On the contrary, the Articles of 
Confederation, the first constitutional document in the United States, begins by providing, 
“Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction, 
and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in 
Congress assembled.”3  Articles of Confederation, art. II.  Only after so providing does the 
document proceed to discuss which enumerated powers were delegated to the United States 
government.  See Articles of Confederation, art. IX.  Thus, the Founders, keenly aware of the 
dangers that resulted from a tyrannical English government, were careful to create a limited 
government possessing only a few enumerated powers.4   
                                                 
3 James Madison clarified that, in this context, “states” “means the people composing those 
political societies, in their highest sovereign capacity.”  James Madison, Report on the Virginia 
Resolutions (Jan. 1800), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/ 
v1ch8s42.html.   
4 The Articles of Confederation, however, were inadequate because, inter alia, they did not 
sufficiently limit the power of state governments.  States had become engaged in the practice of 
enacting protectionist legislation to protect local industries and businesses.  See, e.g., Dept. of 
Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 363 (2008) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  The 
Founders ultimately rectified this deficiency with the insertion of the Commerce Clause in the 
Constitution.  See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 390 
(1994) (citing The Federalist No. 22, at  143-145 (Alexander Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961); 
James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States, in 2 Writings of James 
Madison 362-363 (G. Hunt ed. 1901)).  The Commerce Clause, therefore, fulfilled the Founders’ 
desire to ensure free trade amongst the States, unrestrained by governmental biases, prejudices, 
or regulations.  
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D. The Principle Of A Limited Government Of Enumerated Powers Is 
Enshrined In The Constitution. 
1. The Constitutional Convention proposed a federal government 
of enumerated powers. 
 “The constitution was, from its very origin, contemplated to be the frame of a national 
government, of special and enumerated powers, and not of general and unlimited powers.  This is 
apparent . . . from the history of the proceedings of the convention, which framed it. . . .”  Joseph 
Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 2 § 906 (1833) available at 
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_1s28.html.  At the very beginning of 
the Constitutional Convention, James Madison expressed his desire for a national government of 
explicitly enumerated powers, though he was uncertain whether such an enumeration could be 
accomplished.  William Ewald, James Wilson and the Drafting of the Constitution, 10 U. Pa. J. 
Const. L. 901, 945 (2008).  Other delegates of the Convention, though not all, similarly 
expressed support for an enumeration of powers.  Id. at 986-87 (citing 1 The Records of the 
Federal Convention of 1787 53 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966)).   
 After a month of debate on a wide range of issues, the delegates of the Convention 
appointed a committee “for the purpose of reporting a Constitution conformably to the 
Proceedings aforesaid” so that, going forward, the delegates would have one tangible document 
on which to debate.  Id. at 982 (citing 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 85 
(Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966)).  This Committee of Detail5 began its work with a broad, 
general sketch of the legislative branch provided to it by the Convention: 
                                                 
5 The Committee of Detail was comprised of five delegates:  Nathaniel Gorham, Massachusetts; 
Oliver Ellsworth, Connecticut; Edmund Randolph, Virginia; John Rutledge, South Carolina; and 
James Wilson, Pennsylvania.  Ewald, supra, at 982 (citing 1 The Records of the Federal 
Convention of 1787 87). 
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Resolved[.]  That the Legislature of the United States ought to possess the 
legislative Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation; and moreover to 
legislate in all Cases for the general Interests of the Union, and also in those Cases 
to which the States are separately incompetent, or in which the Harmony of the 
United States may be interrupted by the Exercise of individual Legislation.   
Id. at 986 (citing 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 53).   
 After nearly two weeks of work, the Committee of Detail presented its final document to 
the Convention as a whole.  Id. at 993.  The document that emerged introduced 18 specifically 
enumerated powers for the national legislature, rather than a general grant of legislative powers.  
Id. at 986–93.  Ultimately, most of the proposed enumerated powers were accepted and some 
were rejected.  Id.  Importantly, though, none of the delegates questioned the principle that the 
national government should be limited and comprised solely of defined, enumerated powers.  Id. 
at 994.  
2. The text of the Constitution explicitly creates a federal 
government of enumerated powers. 
 This principle of a limited federal government comprised of defined, enumerated powers 
was written expressly into the text of the Constitution.  Unlike Article II of the Constitution, 
which begins, “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of 
America,” and unlike Article III of the Constitution, which begins, “The judicial Power of the 
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court . . . ,” Article I of the Constitution begins, 
“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress.”  U.S. Const. art. I–III 
(emphasis added).  In so doing, the Founders expressly limited Congress’s power to only those 
powers enumerated “herein” the Constitution.  See U.S. v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589, 596 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(“The Constitution creates a federal government of limited and enumerated powers, and in 
particular a Congress of limited and enumerated powers.  The Article I Vesting Clause confirms 
this proposition, vesting in Congress “[a]ll legislative powers herein granted.”  (Internal citations 
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omitted)); see also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 793 n.9 (1995) (explaining 
that the Founders of the Constitution were keenly aware of the doctrine of expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius (i.e., the enumeration of some excludes all others)).   
3. The doctrine of enumerated powers was embraced during 
discussion and ratification of the proposed Constitution.   
 In the weeks and months following the Constitutional Convention, federalists promoting 
the ratification of the Constitution extolled the principle of enumerated powers to such an extent 
that the Constitution may not have been ratified had such a principle not been explicitly included.  
As one Massachusetts newspaper explained, “‘The constitution defines the powers of Congress; 
& every power, not expressly delegated to that body, remains in the several state legislatures.’”  
Lash, supra, at 1595 n.90 (quoting Editorial, Federal Constitution, Mass. Mercury (Salem), 
Jan. 15, 1788, at 1).  Similarly, a Virginia newspaper supporting ratification declared that 
“‘should Congress attempt to exercise any powers which are not expressly delegated to them, 
their acts would be considered as void, and disregarded.’”  Id. at 1595 (quoting Alexander White, 
To the Citizens of Virginia, Winchester Va. Gazette, Feb. 29, 1788).   
At the Connecticut Convention, Oliver Ellsworth explained that, “If the United States go 
beyond their powers, if they make a law which the Constitution does not authorize, it is void; and 
the judicial power, the national judges, who, to secure their impartiality, are to be made 
independent, will declare it to be void.”  Oliver Ellsworth, Speech in the Connecticut Ratifying 
Convention (Jan. 7, 1788), reprinted in Jonathan Elliot, 2 The Debates In The Several State 
Conventions On The Adoption Of The Federal Constitution 196 (Ayer Co. 1987) (1859).  
Likewise, in the North Carolina Convention, Archibald Maclain explained that “‘[t]he powers of 
Congress are limited and enumerated . . . .  It is as plain a thing as possibly can be, that Congress 
can have no power but what we expressly give them.’”  Lash, supra, at 1596 (quoting Archibald 
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Maclain, Remarks Before the Convention of the State of North Carolina (July 28, 1788)).  James 
Wilson succinctly expressed the principle of enumerated powers when he explained, at the 
Pennsylvania ratifying convention, that “the supreme power . . . resides in the PEOPLE, as the 
fountain of government . . . .  They can delegate it in such proportions, to such bodies, on such 
terms, and under such limitations, as they think proper.”  James Wilson, Speech of Dec. 4, 1787, 
available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch2s14.html. 
 Perhaps the most famous series of newspaper articles supporting ratification of the 
Constitution, The Federalist Papers, expressed similar perspectives.  Alexander Hamilton 
explained that “the State governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which 
they before had, and which were not . . . exclusively delegated to the United States.”  The 
Federalist No. 32, at 241 (Alexander Hamilton) (Wright ed. 1961), available at 
http://www.constitution.org/fed/ federa32.htm.  James Madison likewise provided that “the 
proposed government cannot be deemed a national one; since its jurisdiction extends to certain 
enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty 
over all other objects.”  The Federalist No. 39, at 285 (James Madison) (Wright ed. 1961), 
available at http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa39.htm; see also The Federalist No. 45, at 328 
(James Madison) (Wright ed. 1961), available at http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa45.htm 
(“The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and 
defined.  Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.”).     
Indeed, Madison, colloquially known as the “father of the Constitution,” West Lynne 
Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 n.9 (1994), repeatedly explained the constitutional 
principle of enumerated powers even after ratification.  In 1791, Madison clarified that “‘[n]o 
power . . . not enumerated could be inferred from the general nature of Government.  Had the 
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power of making treaties, for example, been omitted, however necessary it might have been, 
the defect could only have been lamented or supplied by an amendment to the Constitution.’”  
Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. Pa. J. Const. 
L. 183, 192–93 (2003) (quoting 1 Annals of Cong. 1950 (Joseph Gales ed., 1791)).  As Madison 
said in 1792, during the Second Congress, “I, sir, have always conceived—I believe those who 
proposed the Constitution conceived—it is still more fully known, and more material to observe, 
that those who ratified the Constitution conceived—that this is not an indefinite government, 
deriving its powers from the general terms prefixed to the specified powers—but a limited 
government, tied down to the specified powers, which explain and define the general terms.”  
On the Cod Fisheries Bill, granting Bounties (1792), available at http://www.constitution.org/ 
je/je4_cong_deb_12.htm.  And, in 1794, Madison wrote that, “‘[w]hen the people have formed a 
Constitution, they retain those rights which they have not expressly delegated.’” Lash, supra, at 
1597 (quoting 4 Annals of Cong. 934 (1794)). 
4. The Bill of Rights demonstrates the scope and depth of the 
doctrine of enumerated powers. 
 So widely accepted was the principle of enumerated powers amongst the Founders that 
the idea of a Bill of Rights had “never struck the mind of any member of the late convention till 
 . . . within three days of the dissolution of that body, and even then, of so little account was the 
idea, that it passed off in a short conversation, without introducing a formal debate, or assuming 
the shape of a motion.”  James Wilson and John Smilie, James Wilson and John Smilie Debate 
the Need for a Bill of Rights (Nov. 28, 1787).  Importantly, the initial rejection of a Bill of Rights 
was not a repudiation of individual rights in favor of a federal government of plenary powers.  
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Instead, the Bill of Rights was opposed by many delegates because of its implication on the 
enumerated powers doctrine.6   
 As James Wilson, one of the five members of the Committee of Detail at the 
Constitutional Convention, expounded at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention: 
In all societies, there are many powers and rights, which cannot be particularly 
enumerated.  A bill of rights annexed to a constitution is an enumeration of the 
powers reserved.  If we attempt an enumeration, everything that is not enumerated 
is presumed to be given.  The consequence is, that an imperfect enumeration 
would throw all implied power into the scale of the government; and the rights of 
the people would be rendered incomplete. 
James Wilson, Remarks on the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Oct. 28, 1787), available at 
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=978. 
 Likewise, at the North Carolina ratifying convention, James Iredell, who would later 
become one of the original justices on the Supreme Court, proclaimed: 
[I]t would not only be useless, but dangerous, to enumerate a number of rights 
which are not intended to be given up; because it would be implying, in the 
strongest manner, that every right not included in the exception might be impaired 
by the government without usurpation; and it would be impossible to enumerate 
every one.  Let any one make what collection or enumeration of rights he pleases, 
I will immediately mention twenty or thirty more rights not contained in it. 
                                                 
6 This was distinctly different from what existed in England. 
Bills of rights had possessed a relevance in England where there is a king and a 
House of Lords, quite distinct with respect to power and interest from the rest of 
the people.  Since the English kings had claimed all power and jurisdiction, bills 
of rights like the Magna Carta had been considered by them as grants to the 
people.  A bill of rights was used in England to limit the king’s prerogative; he 
could trample on the liberties of the people in every case which was not within 
the restraint of the bill of rights.   
Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 539 (University of North 
Carolina Press 1969) (internal quotations omitted).   
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Calvin R. Massey, The Natural Law Component of the Ninth Amendment, 61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 49, 
86 (1992) (quoting 3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the 
Federal Constitution 97 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) (July 29, 1788)).   
Even the anti-federalist Federal Farmer, who was skeptical of a consolidation of power in 
a federal government, acknowledged in 1788 that one of the proposed Constitution’s virtues was 
its lack of a Bill of Rights, because the federal government would possess only specific, 
enumerated powers.  As he explained: 
Many needless observations, and idle distinctions, in my opinion, have been made 
respecting a bill of rights.  On the one hand, it seems to be considered as a 
necessary distinct limb of the constitution, and as containing a certain number of 
very valuable articles, which are applicable to all societies: and, on the other, as 
useless, especially in a federal government, possessing only enumerated power—
nay, dangerous, as individual rights are numerous, and not easy to be enumerated 
in a bill or rights, and from articles, or stipulations, securing some of them, it may 
be inferred, that others not mentioned are surrendered . . . .  The supreme power is 
undoubtedly in the people, and it is a principle well established in my mind, that 
they reserve all powers not expressly delegated by them to those who govern; this 
is as true in forming a state as in forming a federal government . . . .  When we 
particularly enumerate the powers given, we ought either carefully to enumerate 
the rights reserved, or be totally silent about them; we must either particularly 
enumerate both, or else suppose the particular enumeration of the powers given 
adequately draws the line between them and the rights reserved, particularly to 
enumerate the former and not the latter, I think most advisable: however, as men 
appear generally to have their doubts about these silent reservations, we might 
advantageously enumerate the powers given, and then in general words, according 
to the mode adopted in the 2d art. of the confederation, declare all powers, rights 
and privileges, are reserved, which are not explicitly and expressly given up.  
Letter from the Federal Farmer No. 16 (Jan. 20, 1788) available at http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch14s32.html. 
Years later, Justice Arthur Goldberg, explained: 
Alexander Hamilton was opposed to a bill of rights on the ground that it was 
unnecessary because the Federal Government was a government of delegated 
powers and it was not granted the power to intrude upon fundamental personal 
rights.  The Federalist, No. 84 (Cooke ed., 1961), at 578-579.  He also argued, 
I go further, and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and in the extent in which 
they are contended for, are not only unnecessary in the proposed constitution, but 
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would even be dangerous.  They would contain various exceptions to powers 
which are not granted; and on this very account, would afford a colourable pretext 
to claim more than were granted.  For why declare that things shall not be done 
which there is no power to do?  Why for instance, should it be said, that the 
liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which 
restrictions may be imposed?  I will not contend that such a provision would 
confer a regulating power; but it is evident that it would furnish, to men disposed 
to usurp, a plausible pretence for claiming that power.  Id., at 579.  
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 489 n.4 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).   
The Ninth Amendment, which provides, “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people,” and the Tenth 
Amendment, which provides, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people,” were included in the Bill of Rights specifically to preserve, unequivocally, the doctrine 
of enumerated powers.  Id. at 488-92 (Goldberg, J. concurring).  Indeed, as Justice Goldberg 
wrote: 
The [Ninth] Amendment is almost entirely the work of James Madison.  It was 
introduced in Congress by him and passed the House and Senate with little or no 
debate and virtually no change in language.  It was proffered to quiet expressed 
fears that a bill of specifically enumerated rights could not be sufficiently broad to 
cover all essential rights and that the specific mention of certain rights would be 
interpreted as a denial that others were protected.  
In presenting the proposed Amendment, Madison said: 
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by 
enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would 
disparage those rights which were not placed in that enumeration; 
and it might follow by implication, that those rights which were 
not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the 
General Government, and were consequently insecure.  This is one 
of the most plausible arguments I have ever heard urged against 
the admission of a bill of rights into this system; but, I conceive, 
that it may be guarded against.  I have attempted it, as gentlemen 
may see by turning to the last clause of the fourth resolution (the 
Ninth Amendment).   
I Annals of Congress 439 (Gales and Seaton ed. 1834). 
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Griswold, 381 U.S. at 488-90 (Goldberg, J., concurring).  It is, therefore, clear that the debate 
over the inclusion of a bill of rights, and the inclusion therein of the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments, demonstrate the scope and depth of the doctrine of enumerated powers.  
5. The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that the 
federal government possesses only limited, enumerated powers. 
A long line of cases has established conclusively that the Constitution creates a federal 
government of limited, enumerated powers.  First, in the 1803 seminal case of Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803), Chief Justice Marshall explained: “The powers of 
the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, 
the constitution is written.”  Later, in 1819, the Supreme Court again proclaimed that “[t]his 
government is acknowledged by all, to be one of enumerated powers.”  M’Culloch v. Maryland, 
17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819).  Five years later, the Supreme Court again explained that the 
Constitution “contains an enumeration of powers expressly granted by the people to their 
government.”  Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 187 (1824).  Indeed, “the constant 
declaration of this court from the beginning is that this government is one of enumerated 
powers.”  Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 87 (1907).  
 More recent decisions reach the same conclusion.  In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 
507, 516 (1997), the Supreme Court proclaimed, “Under our Constitution, the Federal 
Government is one of enumerated powers.”  Likewise, in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 
552 (1995), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that:   
We start with first principles.  The Constitution creates a Federal Government of 
enumerated powers.  See Art. I, § 8.  As James Madison wrote:  “The powers 
delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and 
defined.  Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and 
indefinite.”  The Federalist No. 45, pp. 292-293 (C. Rossiter ed., 1961).  This 
constitutionally mandated division of authority “was adopted by the Framers to 
ensure protection of our fundamental liberties.”  Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 
452, 458 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).  “Just as the separation and 
Case 3:10-cv-00188-HEH   Document 137    Filed 10/05/10   Page 23 of 30
 16
independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to 
prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance 
of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of 
tyranny and abuse from either front.”  Ibid. 
Id.  Again, in 2000, the Supreme Court explained that, “With its careful enumeration of federal 
powers and explicit statement that all powers not granted to the Federal Government are 
reserved, the Constitution cannot realistically be interpreted as granting the Federal Government 
an unlimited license to regulate.”  United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619 n.8 (2000).  
Therefore, the Supreme Court held that “[e]very law enacted by Congress must be based on one 
or more of its powers enumerated in the Constitution.”  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607. 
 Ultimately, the principle that the federal government is one of limited, enumerated 
powers is so well documented in the history of the Colonies, so thoroughly and painstakingly set 
forth in documents that led up to the Constitution, as well as in the Constitution and Bill of 
Rights themselves, and so thoughtfully protected in the Supreme Court cases that interpreted the 
Constitution and Bill of Rights, that it cannot seriously be argued that it is not a bedrock 
principle—perhaps the single most important principle—enshrined in the Constitution.   
II. THIS COURT SHOULD HOLD THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL; OTHERWISE, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
WOULD CEASE TO BE A GOVERNMENT OF ENUMERATED 
POWERS.   
Should this Court uphold the Individual Mandate, the federal government would no 
longer be limited to its enumerated powers.  The centuries-old doctrine upon which the federal 
government is based would be eviscerated.   
The Commerce Clause provides that “The Congress shall have Power . . . to regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes[.]”  
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.  The plain language of the Clause, even with help from the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, which provides that Congress has the power to “make all Laws which shall be 
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necessary and proper” to execute the other enumerated powers, U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 18, 
does not empower Congress to regulate any and all forms of human activity or inactivity.  
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607-08 (“[E]ven [our] modern-era precedents which have expanded 
congressional power under the Commerce Clause confirm that this power is subject to outer 
limits.”). 
Yet by enacting the Individual Mandate, that is precisely what Congress has purported to 
do.  Indeed, by enacting the Individual Mandate, Congress is, for the first time in the history of 
the United States, requiring individuals to purchase a product against their will.  In effect, 
Congress has asserted the power to regulate economic inactivity—the decision to refrain from 
engaging in interstate commerce—through the Commerce Clause.7  Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 
702 F.Supp.2d at 612 (“Never before has the Commerce Clause and associated Necessary and 
Proper Clause been extended this far.”).  Such an interpretation has two significant ramifications 
on the enumerated powers doctrine. 
A. If The Individual Mandate Is A Valid Exercise Of The Commerce 
Power, The Commerce Clause Will Swallow Up The Other 
Enumerated Powers. 
Should a court uphold such a broad interpretation of the Commerce Clause, the 
Commerce Clause will swallow up all the other enumerated powers in the Constitution and 
become the lone omnipotent enumerated power.  Indeed, if the Commerce Clause empowers 
Congress to regulate economic inactivity, “many of Congress’ other enumerated powers under 
Art. I, § 8, are wholly superfluous.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 588 (Thomas, J. concurring).  If 
Congress has the power, pursuant to the Commerce Clause, to regulate an individual’s inactivity, 
as well as interstate commerce, then: 
                                                 
7 This Court characterized Plaintiff’s position thusly:  “[A] decision not to purchase a product, 
such as health insurance, is not an economic activity.  It is a virtual state of repose—or 
idleness—the converse of activity.”  Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 702 F.Supp.2d at 610.   
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[T]here is no need for the Constitution to specify that Congress may enact 
bankruptcy laws, cl. 4, or coin money and fix the standard of weights and 
measures, cl. 5, or punish counterfeiters of United States coin and securities, cl. 6.  
Likewise, Congress would not need the separate authority to establish post offices 
and post roads, cl. 7, or to grant patents and copyrights, cl. 8, or to “punish 
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas,” cl. 10.  It might not even need 
the power to raise and support an Army and Navy, cls. 12 and 13, for fewer 
people would engage in commercial shipping if they thought that a foreign power 
could expropriate their property with ease. . . .  An interpretation of cl. 3 that 
makes the rest of § 8 superfluous simply cannot be correct. 
Id. at 588-89 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 520 n.6 
(2008) (discussing the often-cited canon of construction providing that text should be interpreted 
such that no provision is rendered superfluous).8 
B. If The Individual Mandate Is A Valid Exercise Of The Commerce 
Power, The Principle Of A Limited Federal Government With 
Enumerated Powers Will Be Eviscerated. 
Neither the Commerce Clause standing alone, nor in conjunction with the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, can be interpreted broadly and still remain 
consistent with the doctrine of enumerated powers.  As Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story 
remarked:  
What, then, is the true constitutional sense of the words “necessary and proper” 
in this clause?  It has been insisted by the advocates of a rigid interpretation, 
that the word “necessary” is here used in its close and most intense meaning; so 
that it is equivalent to absolutely and indispensably necessary.  It has been said, 
                                                 
8 An earlier Supreme Court case further discusses this canon of construction: 
In expounding the Constitution of the United States, every word must have its 
due force, and appropriate meaning; for it is evident from the whole instrument, 
that no word was unnecessarily used, or needlessly added.  The many 
discussions which have taken place upon the construction of the Constitution, 
have proved the correctness of this proposition; and shown the high talent, the 
caution, and the foresight of the illustrious men who framed it.  Every word 
appears to have been weighed with the utmost deliberation, and its force and 
effect to have been fully understood.  No word in the instrument, therefore, can 
be rejected as superfluous or unmeaning[.] 
Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 571 (1840). 
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that the constitution allows only the means, which are necessary; not those, 
which are merely convenient for effecting the enumerated powers.  If such a 
latitude of construction be given to this phrase, as to give any non-enumerated 
power, it will go far to give every one; for there is no one, which ingenuity 
might not torture into a convenience in some way or other to some one of so 
long a list of enumerated powers.  It would swallow up all the delegated powers, 
and reduce the whole to one phrase.  Therefore it is, that the constitution has 
restrained them to the necessary means; that is to say, to those means, without 
which the grant of the power would be nugatory.  A little difference in the 
degree of convenience cannot constitute the necessity, which the constitution 
refers to. 
Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution 3, § 1239 (1833) available at http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_18s21.html. 
Should the Individual Mandate be upheld as a lawful exercise of the Commerce Clause 
and the Necessary and Proper Clause, the limited federal government of enumerated powers 
would be transformed into an omnipotent government of plenary powers.  Indeed, if Congress is 
empowered to regulate all spheres of activity—or inactivity—in an individual’s life, except those 
explicitly protected in the Bill of Rights, the doctrine of enumerated powers, upon which the 
United States was founded, would cease to exist as to the federal government.  Under such a 
scheme, unalienable rights would be derived not from individuals, as the Declaration of 
Independence and the Constitution provide, but, instead, would exist solely as a permissive 
license by the federal government.  To be sure, “[i]f the Court always defers to Congress . . . , 
little may be left to the notion of enumerated powers.”  Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 47 (2005) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting).  No court that takes its duty to interpret and uphold the Constitution 
seriously may authorize such a radical metamorphosis of a centuries old doctrine at the very 
foundation of the Nation.   
CONCLUSION 
 For the forgoing reasons, this Court should grant the Commonwealth of Virginia’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment and deny the United States’ Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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